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Good morning, and thank you, Chairman Markey and members of the Subcommittee, for the 
opportunity to testify before you today.  On behalf of Governor Deval Patrick and the residents and 
businesses of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, I want to thank you for your leadership in 
addressing our energy challenges and global climate change, and for your wisdom in addressing both 
at the same time.  The Commonwealth and the nation are fortunate to be able to tap your experience 
and knowledge as we work together to craft an energy and climate policy for the 21st century.    
 
We share your view that the time has come for bold action.  We must commit ourselves to 
unleashing the full potential of our nation to solve our energy and climate challenges while growing 
a new clean energy economy.  Your American Climate and Energy Security (ACES) Act makes this 
commitment.  I am here to offer our support for your efforts, and to encourage Congress to move 
forward with the ACES legislation expeditiously. 
 
We appreciate greatly the leadership of Chairmen Waxman and Markey in proposing a 
comprehensive and forward-looking approach to addressing our energy and environmental 
challenges, and agree with the measured and sensible approach in the proposed legislation regarding 
transmission authorities – one that we believe upholds successful competition in regional energy 
markets, and supports the continued and proven role of regional resource planning efforts, while 
expanding the role of FERC in coordinating such regional planning across regions, and supporting 
the development of interconnection-wide joint planning review.   
 
But I am here today to strongly caution committee members against the temptation to add to the draft 
legislation the more drastic step that has been proposed to expand the traditional transmission 
authority of FERC well beyond transmission reliability and into resource planning and development, 
particularly against the backdrop of the related efforts to rapidly deploy interconnection-wide 
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transmission “superhighways,” such as that conceptualized in the Joint Coordinated System Plan 
(JCSP).  In our view, the expansion of FERC authority into centralized resource planning and 
associated siting jurisdiction violates fundamental free market principles, is unwarranted from 
energy or environmental policy perspectives, would diminish or eliminate the proven benefits of 
competition in electricity markets, including the fostering of local renewable and energy efficiency 
resources, and would strip states and indeed whole regions of critical policy authority over energy 
resource planning. 
 
At the outset, I want to recognize the appropriate level of jurisdiction that FERC does and should 
have over transmission in interstate commerce.  The maintenance of robust transmission 
infrastructure is critical to supporting competitive markets and ensuring the safe and reliable 
operation of our interconnected transmission networks.  FERC currently has, and should have, 
backstop authority for siting interstate transmission projects that are needed to meet federally 
enforceable reliability standards, or to address major existing transmission system bottlenecks.  
When it comes to challenges to system reliability or significant congestion on the existing 
transmission system, the federal government needs to step in when states do not act in a reasonable 
timeframe.  Given the recent Fourth Circuit court decision, it would be wise for Congress to address 
the concerns of the court, and clarify FERC’s authority in this area.  
 
But key to FERC’s authority on siting is its limitation to projects needed to maintain bulk power 
system reliability.  This is fundamentally different from what is proposed in draft transmission 
legislation being floated in the House and Senate, which would dramatically expand FERC’s siting 
and – more significantly – planning authority to include new transmission that is not needed for 
reliability, but instead is only needed to interconnect new generating resources to the transmission 
network.  While on its face this seems like a laudable goal, especially when linked to bringing 
distant renewables to market, the practical impact is likely to lead to costly and inefficient results – 
and would be a dramatic federal intervention of central-planning into currently successful regionally-
managed competitive energy markets.  In short, federal decisions that dictate the generation that will 
be used to meet electricity demands on a national basis from among all possible sources will 
override the operation of competitive electricity markets, and squash state and regional efforts to 
promote demand response, energy efficiency and local renewable resource development.   
 
In contrast, we believe that renewable resources steered to market need to be those that are lowest 
cost, as determined by testing all options within a competitive market framework, one that operates 
subject to legislated emission caps and renewable resource floors.  I want to be clear; the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts recognizes that our need to address the carbon challenge is 
paramount; but we will fail in this challenge if the path we choose to do so abandons the free market 
principles that we rely on to maintain steady downward pressure on costs and upward support for 
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technological innovation.  FERC’s reliance on competition in wholesale electricity markets as a de-
facto determination that wholesale rates are just and reasonable is a lynchpin of these principles in 
their application to wholesale electricity markets across the country, and deviation from competition 
will come at a great cost to our nation’s electricity consumers.   
 
In the world of electricity, there are three pillars that we must rely on to enable us to meet our 
energy and environmental objectives at the lowest possible cost: 
 
• First, we must continue the evolution of FERC’s oversight of wholesale electricity rates 
across the country in a way that increases reliance on regional competitive market 
structures to capture system efficiencies and to fairly allocate risks and rewards among 
market participants and consumers.  This includes expansion of short- and long-term 
markets for energy, capacity, transmission rights, and ancillary services; 
• Second, we must continue to meet our emission reduction goals through cap-and-trade 
emission control programs that rely on allowance trading to meet established annual 
emission caps through market-driven mechanisms that achieve lowest costs; and 
• Finally, we should meet our renewable development objectives not through central 
planning, but through market-based minimum portfolio standards that establish an 
incremental monetary value for renewable generation, though the sale of tradable 
renewable energy credits in regional and, hopefully, national markets. 
 
In every instance, the guiding principle is for legislators and regulators to set the rules, and then 
leave it to the creativity of the marketplace to produce the most efficient – and least cost – 
compliance path.  The Energy and Commerce Committee has done this many times and it has 
yielded impressive results.  Indeed, this is the very framework encompassed in the Waxman-Markey 
legislation – we applaud you for this approach, and urge you to maintain it.   
 
To understand my concern regarding the risk to free markets and competition in the various 
proposals for central transmission planning, it is instructive to consider the operation of existing 
wholesale markets and the potential impact of the transmission superhighway vision. 
 
Where competitive markets operate (and here I describe markets in the Northeast, but the principles 
are the same in competitive markets across the country), new resource developers of all types 
compete in a competitive capacity, energy and reserve markets to meet existing and future demand.  
In New England, the market response has been overwhelming, with active and successful 
participation by demand response and renewable resources.  Well over 10,000 megawatts of demand 
response and supply resources, including renewables, have responded to competitive market auctions 
that seek just hundreds of megawatts of new demand.  All of these resources compete to meet future 
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demand in a manner consistent with our underlying energy and environmental objectives.  
Specifically, resources compete: 
 
(1) with full internalization of the cost of NOx, SO2, and CO2 associated with national and 
regional cap and trade programs – increasing the price offered by fossil-based resources; 
(2) with full internalization of the value of renewable resources through the issuance and 
trading of renewable energy credits generated by state renewable portfolio standards – 
decreasing the price offered by renewable resources; and 
(3) with full internalization of all development costs, including the cost to transmit power 
reliably to load.  This last point is fundamental to the efficient operation of free and 
competitive markets, placing all competing entities on an equal footing, and removing 
development risks from captive ratepayers, and placing it with the development and financial 
communities – precisely the entities most able to manage such risks over time. 
 
In this way, evolution of our region’s power system happens in a manner that meets our states’ 
energy and environmental policy goals, but does so at delivered prices to ratepayers that are driven 
to their lowest possible levels by competition.  
 
By contrast, proposed legislation to expand central planning and siting authorities would enable, and 
in effect require, that FERC approve, site, and allocate to ratepayers the costs and risks associated 
with building transmission to connect some types of generation, with insufficient consideration of 
what this means to the prices consumers pay at the end of the line.  Combined with the 
interconnection-wide vision embraced by the JCSP, this approach would lead to a direct subsidy for 
distant resources only, on a discriminatory basis, thus eliminating the level playing field that exists 
in regional markets.  This will needlessly increase electricity prices to consumers, and most 
importantly would seriously derail the development of local and regional energy efficiency, demand 
response and renewable resource alternatives.  This would be a bad outcome for consumers, and for 
meeting long-term environmental objectives alike.   
 
The impact of such a scheme would be significant, and long-lived.  By way of example (again using 
the Northeast context here), how might it have this effect?  Recall that in New England we have 
over 10,000 MW of demand response, renewable, and traditional resources competing in a market 
that has a need for only 1,000 to 2,000 MW of new resources over the next couple decades, and has 
less than 30,000 MW of existing demand.  If FERC, with its new resource planning authority, 
moves quickly on a major transmission buildout as conceived in the Joint Coordinated System Plan, 
this would, as a result of a single, non-market planning decision, dump on the order of several 
thousand MW of resources into New England along new high-voltage lines.  This would wipe out 
the need for new resources in our region for decades, dramatically reduce opportunities for new 
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local resources to compete with existing resources to meet existing demand, and by flooding the 
market could seriously diminish market prices for energy, capacity, and reserves (even though such 
price reductions would not benefit consumers, as they would be offset by transmission development 
costs that are embedded in pass-through transmission rates).   
 
Over the past few years, one thing has become clear:  the development of new energy efficiency, 
demand response, and local renewable resources in market regions relies critically on energy, 
capacity and reserve market revenues to attract investor interest, fund development and maintain 
profitability.  The expansion of central resource planning and the subsidization (through allocation of 
transmission costs to captive ratepayers) of distant generation thereby present the very real scenario 
of crushing the market value of local and regional conservation and renewable resource 
development.  This will unintentionally disfavor local renewables which are near load centers (even 
though their total all-in delivered cost might well be lower), because we will effectively give a free 
ride to the distant renewables since they will not have to bear the cost of their transmission 
investments in their delivered costs. 
 
On a very practical level, while in our region we have abundant land-based renewables that stand 
ready to compete, it is also worth mentioning one potential casualty of the focus on Midwest 
resources and FERC planning authority could be the most promising advanced emerging energy 
technology available to our country today.  The very best wind resource in our country – from the 
perspectives of resource size, distribution, capacity factor, reliability, proximity to population 
centers, and minimization of environmental impact – is located a short distance off the major load 
centers of the East Coast.  For sure, offshore wind turbine installation may currently cost more than 
on-shore wind development, but better wind resource economics, decreasing unit costs with 
increased development opportunities, and the absence of the need for cross-country transmission 
could make offshore wind competitive with remote wind farms.  The higher cost of construction 
may well be more than offset by the markedly lower cost of transmission.  In short, offshore wind 
should and must have that opportunity to compete on a delivered energy cost basis – and not be 
disadvantaged by transmission subsidies for other forms of renewable power generation.  Given the 
sheer magnitude of this resource potential so close to our nation’s major load centers, and the 
opportunity to have it developed incrementally, disbursed geographically, and through many 
different interconnections along the coast (improving power system reliability), we would miss an 
enormous opportunity to not focus aggressively on its development, and we would be making a 
grave mistake to preclude its development by overwhelming local markets with a high volume of 
power from distant generation sources. 
 
Recognizing the abundance of on-shore and off-shore renewable development potential in the 
Northeast, the New England Governors have been working cooperatively, and with ISO-New 
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England, to develop a New England Governors’ Energy Blueprint (Blueprint).  The Blueprint 
analyzes the development of up to 12,000 MW of on- and off-shore wind and other renewable 
development potential in the region, and will review (1) potential transmission pathways for such 
development, (2) the existing state-by-state competitive procurement and long-term contracting 
mechanisms that can provide the revenue certainty needed for development efforts, and (3) state and 
potentially joint regional procedures to facilitate the siting of associated interstate transmission lines.  
The Blueprint effort is a joint cooperative planning effort coordinated by the region’s Governors, 
energy offices, and public utility commissions, and is being carried out in close cooperation with the 
regional system operator. 
 
I recognize that support is building for transmission from wind projects in Texas and the Dakotas to 
load centers thousands of miles away.  Bringing renewable energy to market from remote sources 
should certainly be one option for meeting our clean energy needs.  But if we are to meet those 
needs in the most economic and responsible way, such resources must compete on a fair and equal 
basis with demand-side and renewable resource alternatives within each region – based on the price 
of power at the point of consumption, including all transmission and other development costs.  And 
the path to this result starts from the bottom up – at the level of state and regional planning, policies, 
and markets.  The role of FERC in this planning exercise should be focused on and limited to 
coordination and information sharing between regions, and facilitating the development of formal 
interregional analyses.  In strongly endorsing this approach, the bill put forth by Chairmen Waxman 
and Markey got it exactly right.  
 
In contrast, without recognizing these fundamental market principles, proposed legislation to expand 
federal siting authority is not simply about transmission siting, but something far more.  It will 
effectively strip states and regions of their resource planning functions, eliminate them as 
laboratories for the development of innovative low-carbon alternatives, seriously damage the 
function of competition in regional electricity markets and, in so doing, drive up electricity prices 
unnecessarily.    
 
Thus I urge you to focus not on an expansion of FERC’s authority over resource planning, or the 
build out of a massive transmission system focused on one set of pre-determined renewable 
generation resources, but rather to retain the basic approach to federal oversight of regional planning 
coordination outlined in the Waxman/Markey draft legislation.  We can then focus on how to direct 
funding and assistance in a way that brings the best and most economic and promising renewable 
resources to market, in the context of local resource availability and regional system planning.  This 
will lead to the most effective use of government research and development assistance dollars, 
preserve the competitive market foundation for electricity resource additions, minimize the cost of 
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electricity to consumers, and leave in place an appropriate level of state and regional review of 
electricity infrastructure development. 
 
Many of the concerns I have mentioned today are shared in a letter to Chairmen Waxman and 
Markey supported by a bipartisan groups of 11 Govenors representing every coastal state from 
Maine to Virginia (Appendix A).  The Governors recognized the high value of local development of 
on and offshore renewable resources in the East, and urged Congress to avoid a central planning 
solution and instead create strong, fair and efficient markets for efficiency and renewables, consider 
long-term contract mechanisms to support the competitive development of renewable resources 
based on the delivered price of electricity, encourage regional plans to promote local renewable 
resources and offshore renewable development, and evaluate expansion of the federal investment tax 
credit.  I urge you to consider the measures recommended in the Governors letter, and to refrain 
from a more planning-focused approach that would likely be a more costly and inefficient path to the 
development of renewable resources in our country. 
 
I want to thank you again for this opportunity to comment, and would be happy to follow up with 
the Committee in whatever manner is most helpful. 
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LETTER OF THE EASTERN GOVERNORS ON 
RENEWABLES AND TRANSMISSION PLANNING 




